Curricum Vitae. 06/03
Publications Working papers home
Olivier COMPTE
Born in Paris, November 13th, 1965
Professional Address CERAS, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées
28, rue des Saints-Pères ,
75007 Paris, France
(Tel :33 1 44 58 28 78-Fax 33 1 44 58 28 80- email compte@enpc.fr)
1. Education
1. Ecole Polytechnique, 1984-1987
2. Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 1987-89
3. Ph. D Stanford, 1994: "Private Observations, Communications and Coordination in Repeated Games"
2. Employment
Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées
Research fellow at CERAS-ENPC
3. Awards
1. Scholarship Stanford
2. Scholarship Fulbright
4. Research Interests
Application of game theory to auctions, bargaining and collusion.
5. Publications
[1] International negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms: the case of environmental negotiations (co-authored with Philippe Jehiel) (1997) in International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues ed. Carlo Carraro Edward Elgar.
[2] Communication in Repeated games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (Econometrica, may 1998, p.597-626).
[3] Bargaining while Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions, (co-authored with Philippe Aghion and Philippe Jehiel) European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (1998).
[4] On Failing to Cooperate when Monitoring is Private, (2002) Journal of Economic Theory
[5] Collusion, Mergers and Capacity Constraints, (2002) (joint with Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey), European Economic Review ,46, 1-29
[6] On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica.
[7] On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica
[8] On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, (2002) Journal of Economic Theory
[9] Volontary Contributions to a joint Project : The asymmetric case, (2003) Journal of Economic Theory
6. Working papers
[1] On the role of arbitration in negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[2] When outside options force concessions to be gradual (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[3] Multi-party negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel),
[4] Corruption and Competition in Procurement (joint with Ariane Lambert and Thierry Verdier)
[5] Volontary Contributions to a joint project : Revisiting Admati –Perry’s contribution game (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[6] Secret Price Cutting : an illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic
[7] The winner’s curse with independent private values
[8] On the virtues of the ascending price auction : new insights in the private value setting (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[9] Confidence enhanced performance (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
[10] Credible Threats, Reputation and Private Monitoring.
[11] Auctions and Information acquisition : Sealed-bid or dynamic formats ? (joint with Philippe Jehiel).
[12] Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution games (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[13] Gathering Information before Signing a Contract : A new Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
[14] Prediction errors and the winner’s curse.
[15] The Wait and See Option in Ascending Auctions (joint with Philippe Jehiel).
[16] Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
c.v.