Curricum Vitae. 06/03                 Publications      Working papers      home

 

Olivier COMPTE

Born in Paris, November 13th, 1965

 

Professional Address CERAS, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées

28, rue des Saints-Pères ,
75007 Paris, France

(Tel :33 1 44 58 28 78-Fax 33 1 44 58 28 80- email compte@enpc.fr)

 

1. Education

1. Ecole Polytechnique, 1984-1987

2. Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 1987-89

3. Ph. D Stanford, 1994: "Private Observations, Communications and Coordination in Repeated Games"

 

2. Employment

Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées

Research fellow at CERAS-ENPC

 

3. Awards

1. Scholarship Stanford

2. Scholarship Fulbright

 

4. Research Interests

Application of game theory to auctions, bargaining and collusion.

 

5. Publications

[1] International negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms: the case of environmental negotiations (co-authored with Philippe Jehiel) (1997) in International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues ed. Carlo Carraro Edward Elgar.

[2] Communication in Repeated games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (Econometrica, may 1998, p.597-626).

 

[3] Bargaining while Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions, (co-authored with Philippe Aghion and Philippe Jehiel) European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (1998).

 

[4] On Failing to Cooperate when Monitoring is Private, (2002) Journal of Economic Theory

 

[5] Collusion, Mergers and Capacity Constraints, (2002) (joint with Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey), European Economic Review ,46, 1-29

 

[6] On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica.

 

[7] On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), Econometrica

 

[8] On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, (2002) Journal of Economic Theory

 

[9] Volontary Contributions to a joint Project : The asymmetric case, (2003) Journal of Economic Theory

 

6. Working papers

 

[1] On the role of arbitration in negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

 

[2] When outside options force concessions to be gradual (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

[3] Multi-party negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel),

[4] Corruption and Competition in Procurement (joint with Ariane Lambert and Thierry Verdier)

[5] Volontary Contributions to a joint project : Revisiting Admati –Perry’s contribution game (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

[6] Secret Price Cutting : an illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic

[7] The winner’s curse with independent private values

[8] On the virtues of the ascending price auction : new insights in the private value setting (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

[9] Confidence enhanced performance (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)

[10] Credible Threats, Reputation and Private Monitoring.

[11] Auctions and Information acquisition : Sealed-bid or dynamic formats ? (joint with Philippe Jehiel).

[12] Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution games (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

[13] Gathering Information before Signing a Contract : A new Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

[14] Prediction errors and the winner’s curse.

[15] The Wait and See Option in Ascending Auctions (joint with Philippe Jehiel).

[16] Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

c.v.