

Olivier COMPTE

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Education : Ecole Polytechnique, 1984-87 ; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 1987-89 ; Ph. D Stanford, 1994: "Private Observations, Communications and Coordination in Repeated Games"

Employer : Ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées (since 1994), Economic Theory Chair at Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Research : auctions, bargaining, repeated games, economics and psychology, bounded rationality, decision theory

Teaching (currently) Game theory (M1, APE), Bargaining (M2, APE)

Editorial work: Journal of Economic Theory (associate editor), Theoretical Economics (associate editor)

Publications.

[1] International negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms: the case of environmental negotiations (co-authored with Philippe Jehiel) (1997) in International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues ed. Carlo Carraro Edward Elgar.

[2] Communication in Repeated games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (*Econometrica*, may 1998, p.597-626).

[3] Bargaining while Searching for Outside Options: A Potential Role for Unions, (joint with Philippe Aghion and Philippe Jehiel) *European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* (1998).

[4] On Failing to Cooperate when Monitoring is Private, (2002) *Journal of Economic Theory*

[5] Collusion, Mergers and Capacity Constraints, (2002) (joint with Frédéric Jenny and Patrick Rey), *European Economic Review* ,46, 1-29

[6] On the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), *Econometrica*.

[7] On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions, (2002) (joint with Philippe Jehiel), *Econometrica*

[8] On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations, (2002) *Journal of Economic Theory*

[9] Voluntary Contributions to a joint Project : The asymmetric case, (2003) *Journal of Economic Theory*

[10] Corruption and Competition in Procurement (joint with Ariane Lambert and Thierry Verdier) (2004) *Rand Journal of Economics*

[11] Confidence enhanced performance (joint with Andrew Postlewaite), 2004, *American Economic Review*

- [12] Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution games (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, *Review of Economic Studies*
- [13] The Wait and See Option in Ascending Auctions (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2004, *Journal of the European Economic Association*
- [14] Gathering Information before Signing a Contract : A Screening Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 *International Journal of Industrial Organization*
- [15] On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007 *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*.
- [16] Auctions and Information acquisition : Sealed-bid or dynamic formats ? (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2007, *Rand Journal of Economics*.
- [17] Veto constraint in Mechanism design: Inefficiency with correlated types (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2008, *American Economic Journal: Micro*.
- [18] Bargaining and Majority Rules: A collective search Perspective (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, *Journal of Political Economy*
- [19] The coalitional Nash bargaining Solution (joint with Philippe Jehiel), 2010, *Econometrica*

Working papers.

- [1] On the role of arbitration in negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [2] When outside options force concessions to be gradual (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [3] Multi-party negotiations (joint with Philippe Jehiel),
- [4] Secret Price Cutting : an illustration of the Divide and Conquer Tactic
- [5] The winner's curse with independent private values
- [6] Credible Threats, Reputation and Private Monitoring.
- [7] Prediction errors and the winner's curse.
- [8] Bargaining with Reference Dependent Preferences (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [9] Inefficiencies in Bargaining : departing from Myerson Satterthwaite and Akerlof (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [10] Repeated games with limited information processing (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [11] Plausible cooperation (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [12] Mental processes and decision making (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [13] Auction notes (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)
- [14] Voluntary Participation and Reassignment in Two-sided Matching (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [15] On the Optimal Majority Rule (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [16] Group Decisions (joint with Philippe Jehiel)
- [17] Plausible Theories of Behavior (joint with Andrew Postlewaite)

